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A COST ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RESPONSE TO 






On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami triggered overwhelming 
destruction and loss that had global implications.  Because of the random nature of 
disasters, funding for response efforts is not currently included in the budget submitted 
for the Department of Defense. Thus, when the Department of the Navy responds to a 
natural disaster and provides humanitarian assistance, great fiscal costs are incurred, 
which must be accurately tracked and reported for reimbursement.   
This project investigates the response of the U.S. Navy following the 2011 
Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan.  The objective of this research is to analyze the 
operating costs associated with each DoN vessel and aircraft type.  In order to determine 
the most cost-effective platform(s) the Navy should use when responding to a disaster, an 
in-depth analysis of all direct and indirect costs associated is provided. As a result, this 
analysis will provide senior leaders and policy makers with timely operational and 
financial policy recommendations to better prepare for unforeseen events in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE 
On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami triggered overwhelming 
destruction and loss, ensuing an immediate global response from humanitarian 
organizations to provide aid and relief.  The Department of the Navy (DoN) responded as 
a major provider of humanitarian relief to the country of Japan.  In A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the DoN delineated humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response (HA/DR) as one of six expanded core capabilities for the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Coast Guard (Department of the Navy [DoN], 2007).  However, natural 
disasters and humanitarian efforts are not currently included in budget submissions for 
the Department of Defense (DoD).  Thus, when the United States Navy (USN) responds 
to a natural disaster and provides humanitarian assistance, significant costs are incurred.  
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
Due to the unforeseen nature of natural disasters, the DoN cannot precisely 
predict all costs associated with future HA/DR missions.  Not every disaster is the same; 
therefore, not every HA/DR mission encompasses the same costs.  Although costs vary 
for each natural disaster, identifying the operational cost drivers associated with HA/DR 
missions can enable budget analysts, comptrollers, and operational planners to better 
prepare for future disasters.  Under conditions of resource scarcity, the DoN must operate 
efficiently when conducting all operations to include HA/DR missions.  
The capabilities of USN ships that responded to previous HA/DR missions such 
as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2010 Pakistan floods are described by Greenfield 
and Ingram (2011).  The authors emphasized that   
Knowing the best possible asset to assign to a disaster will improve the 
DoD’s effectiveness in regaining stability, both monetarily and 
logistically, within the affected region as disasters occur, and knowing 
which assets are best suited for disaster response will help the USN with 
future force structure and fleet composition. (p. 6)  
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Our project investigates the costs associated with the response of the DoN 
following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan.  We review the direct and 
indirect operating costs associated with the initial responding DoN assets of the HA/DR 
mission between March 2011 and June 2011. Ures (2011) used a similar technique to 
determine the incremental operating costs for the HA/DR missions in the case study that 
evaluated the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2010 Pakistan floods, and the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami.  Our analysis takes Ures’ technique a step further to determine not only 
the incremental cost drivers but also the specific unit types (i.e., ships and aircraft) that 
incurred the most operating costs throughout the response. 
By identifying the cost drivers and the unit types that incur the most significant 
portion of HA/DR operational costs, the DoN can determine the most cost-effective 
platform(s) to use in future HA/DR missions.  We use the Tohoku earthquake and 
subsequent tsunami cost data provided to us from our sources to identify the total cost of 
the HA/DR mission borne by the DoN.  From this cost data, we will identify the cost 
elements associated with the initial ship and aircraft response of the HA/DR mission. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The structure of this research project encompasses a total of five chapters.  In the 
next chapter, we discuss more broadly the background of the Tohoku earthquake and the 
subsequent events involving the United States and the DoD.  The background chapter 
also briefly describes Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid 
(OHDACA) funding.  In Chapter III, we describe the methodology used to both collect 
and analyze the data needed to answer our questions about operating costs.  In Chapter 
IV, we analyze the empirical data collected from our sources.  Finally, in Chapter V, we 




A. UNITED STATES DISASTER RESPONSE 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a disaster as an 
event that causes 100 deaths injuries, or damage exceeding one million U.S. dollars 
(FEMA, 2010).  The first several hours after a major natural disaster constitute a period 
of incomplete situational awareness (United States Department of State Humanitarian 
Information Unit [HIU], 2010).  The initial challenge in determining what is needed 
during a natural disaster is compounded by continually changing conditions, disrupted  
and damaged infrastructures, and limited transportation and communications.  The next 
challenge is getting the required resources to the location where they are needed as 
quickly as possible.  Historically, many organizations have come together to effectively 
bring these resources to those in need. 
The United States military has a considerable legacy of assisting those in need 
around the world.  As Elleman (2007) noted, “humanitarian relief has long been 
recognized as a mission of the American armed forces and of the U.S. Navy in particular” 
(Foreword).  Thus, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issued policy guidance for the 
DoD overseas Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), emphasizing interoperability 
and capacity building, which are key mechanisms of security cooperation.  Humanitarian 
assistance (HA) project planners are encouraged to develop partnerships with host nation 
(HN) representatives as well as “[state government] agencies as appropriate . . . to 
conduct HA projects that benefit the civilian populace and enhance the host government’s 
ability to provide essential services for its populace” (Office of the Secretary of Defense 
[OSD], 2009, p. 6). 
As a result, the DoD is preparing for, and contributing more effectively to, foreign 
disaster relief and HA missions.  As the OSD stated in its 2009 policy guidance, “DoD 
HA projects must also address the humanitarian needs of the targeted population; projects 
must be designed in coordination with HN representatives and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to generate a sustained humanitarian impact” (p. 
 4
7).  As the OSD (2009) guidance further stated, “All HA projects should maximize 
visible U.S. military participation” (p. 8).  The SECDEF explained that “active DoD 
participation improves the prospects for developing channels of access and influence, 
potentially provides operational readiness benefits, and generates unique training 
opportunities” (OSD, 2009, p. 8).  To achieve a successful HA/DR response, Thomas 
(2003) claimed that it “depends on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and 
receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian relief effort” (Apte, 2009, Introduction). 
With the SECDEF’s guidance, the DoN is fully capable of accomplishing successful 
HA/DR missions around the world. 
B. TOHOKU DISASTERS 
On Friday, March 11, 2011, at 2:46 p.m., Japan suffered a calamitous 9.0-
magnitude (M9) earthquake 80 miles east of Sendai, Honshu, Japan, when the Pacific 
tectonic plate violently thrust or moved beneath the North American plate, forcing the 
North American plate upward (United States Geological Survey [USGS], 2011a).  The 
USGS National Earthquake Information Center reported that the Tohoku earthquake 
occurred between the Pacific and North American plates, at 38.297°N, 142.372°E, at a 
depth of 18.6 miles (USGS, 2011a).  The earthquake lasted for approximately five 
minutes, and the energy from the plate compression displaced massive sums of ocean 
water.  As the water neared land, the built-up energy produced a 32-foot tsunami, causing 
astonishing destruction to Japan’s northeastern coastline (University Navstar Consortium 
[UNAVCO], 2011).  These two natural disasters caused a catastrophic crisis at the 







Once both USGS and Japanese seismologists updated the magnitude from 8.9 to 
9.0, the Tohoku earthquake became the largest earthquake to hit Japan in recorded history 
and the fourth largest earthquake in the world since 1900 (USGS, 2011b).  The black star 
east of Sendai in Figure 1 indicates the location of the earthquake’s epicenter.  A series of 
foreshocks shook Japan for two days prior, as well as several sizeable aftershocks for two 
days following the M9 earthquake.  The powerful earthquake moved global positioning 
system (GPS) stations nearest the epicenter 13 feet east and shifted Earth on its axis by an 
estimated 6.5 inches (Chang, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.   Japan Intensity Map (From: USGS, 2011c) 
Nine magnitude-7 earthquakes have occurred in the Japan Trench subduction 
zone since 1973 (USGS, 2011b).  Offshore earthquakes and ensuing tsunamis often hit 
this coastal region “because it has many deep coastal embayments that amplify tsunami 
waves and cause great wave inundations” (USGS, 2011b).  As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
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fierce then diminishing tsunami impact stretched across the globe in less than 24 hours.  
The tsunami damaged buildings and homes in the Galapagos Islands, Peru, Chile, 
Hawaii, California, and Oregon (USGS, 2011c). 
 
Figure 2.   Predicted Tsunami Wave Propagation (From: Bruckner, 2011) 
In the past decade, there have been around 400 reported disasters per year, 
affecting nearly 150–220 million people per year and resulting in damages to the tune of 
$20 billion per year (Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & Guha-Sapir, 2010).  The total estimated 
cost of the Tohoku disaster exceeded $309 billion, which may be the most expensive 
natural disaster ever recorded (USGS, 2011a). 
From Chiba to Aomori, the earthquake and tsunami caused 15,703 confirmed 
deaths and 5,314 injuries, and approximately 4,647 people remain missing (USGS, 
2011c).   
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Along the coastline, destruction and damage caused displacement for approximately 
131,000 people and destroyed 332,395 buildings, as evidenced in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Port of Ofunato, Japan (From: Montesino de Stuart, 2011) 
However, the massive tsunami hit Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima the hardest.  
Nuclear reactors were severely damaged, and utilities such as gas, water supplies, and 
electricity were disrupted (USGS, 2011b).  According to the USGS (2011b), 
approximately 2,126 roads, 56 bridges, and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged.  
Fires erupted in Chiba, landslides occurred in Miyagi, and “at least 1,800 homes 
destroyed when a dam failed in Fukushima” (USGS, 2011b).  On March 15, four days 
after the initial earthquake, a harsh winter storm dropped snow on the devastated cities.  
As Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan observed, “In the 65 years after the end of World 
War II, this is the toughest and the most difficult crisis for Japan” (CNN Wire Staff, 
2011). 
Apte (2009) classified disasters into four categories based on whether they have a 
slow or sudden onset and whether the damage is localized or dispersed. The level of 
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difficulty of operations in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief increases 
as the onset speed changes from slow to sudden and as the disaster is no longer localized.  
In reference to this model, Figure 4 indicates the classification of each stage of the 
Tohoku crisis and the level of difficulty associated with each stage according to Apte’s 
model.  The M9 earthquake is classified as a localized, sudden-onset disaster.  The 
follow-on tsunami is classified as a dispersed, sudden-onset disaster.  The nuclear crisis is 
classified as a dispersed, slow-onset crisis. 
 
Figure 4.   Tohoku Crisis Classification (After: Apte, 2009) 
Note. This figure was adapted from the source by adding the location of each event on the matrix. 
 
C. JAPAN’S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE 
Immediately following the disaster, the Japanese government formally requested 
humanitarian assistance from the United Nations (UN), the United States Embassy 
Department of State (DoS), and the USAID.  The DoS, as outlined in the Presidential 
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Directive/NSC-27 of 1978, assumes the role as lead federal agency (LFA) in the event of 
a non-military disaster (Perry, 2009).  Within the USAID, which is a subagency of the 
DoS, is the Office of Foreign Disaster Affairs (OFDA).  The OFDA has the primary 
responsibility for coordinating U.S. disaster response and is designated as the LFA at the 
operational level (Perry, 2009).  At the operational level, the USAID deploys Disaster 
Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to analyze and assess the scope of the damage and 
the capabilities of host-nation assets and to coordinate ground efforts with other agencies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even the military (Perry, 2009).  Figure 5 
outlines the flow of information in the disaster relief process in relation to the DoS as the 
LFA. 
 
Figure 5.   State as the Lead Federal Agency  (After: Perry, 2009) 
Note. This figure was adapted from the source by adding the Disaster Strikes category to the diagram. 
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Although the USAID generally prefers to use civilian assets to accomplish its 
mission, the immense distance and scope of the Japanese disaster required the use of 
military assets.  In a memorandum dated March 11, 2011, Executive Secretary Christa 
White of the USAID formally requested the first involvement from the DoD, seeking 
“assistance to provide [airlift] transportation support on a reimbursable basis to the 
overall U.S. Government relief effort in Japan” (USAID, 2011, p.1).  Based on the 
recommendations of the DART, DoS Executive Secretary Stephen Mull requested 
additional DoD involvement to provide sea and air transportation support in conducting 
search and rescue operations, regional disaster surveillance and assessments, logistical 
support to the government of Japan, and refueling assistance to Japanese aircraft (DoS, 
2011).   
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT 
Responsibility for military response to any disaster around the globe lies with the 
geographic combatant commander (COCOM).  Presently, there are six geographic 
COCOMs covering the regions of North America, South America, Europe, Africa, 
Southwest Asia, and the East Asia/Pacific.  The United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), headquartered in Hawaii, is the COCOM for the East Asia/Pacific area of 
responsibility (AOR).  Figure 6 shows a detailed map of the USPACOM AOR, which 
covers 36 countries home to 50% of the world’s population, a majority of the world’s 
ocean island nations, and about half of Earth’s surface area.  Because of this vast area of 
coverage, one of the USPACOM’s primary mission objectives is to strengthen and 
expand relationships with allies and partners (USPACOM, 2011a).  A primary means of 








Figure 6.   USPACOM Area of Responsibility Map (From: USPACOM, 2011a) 
The naval element of the USPACOM is the commander of the United States 
Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT).  The COMPACFLT comprises all air, surface, and 
subsurface naval elements throughout the western United Sates, as well as throughout the 
Pacific regions of Hawaii, Korea, the Marianas, and Japan.  Within the country of Japan 
alone, the DoD maintains nearly a dozen major bases and facilities, half of which fall 
under the purview of the COMPACFLT.  U.S. presence in Japan constitutes about 38,000 
military Service members ashore, 11,000 afloat, and nearly 5,000 DoD civilian personnel 
(Chanlett-Avery & Feickert, 2011).  Figure 7 shows the location of major U.S. military 







Figure 7.   Map of Japan and U.S. DoD Bases (From:Chanlett-Avery &  
Feickert, 2011, p. 3) 
Since the end of World War II, Japan has remained a close ally of the U.S. in the 
Pacific region.  Therefore, Operation TOMODACHI, which is Japanese for friend, 
became the official name of the DoD relief effort.  DoD efforts during the first 10 days of 
the disaster focused heavily on transport of relief supplies, personnel, and equipment.  In 
a statement to the media on March 12, 2011, the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo indicated that 
United States Ship (USS) Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), 
originally headed east, was diverted to provide relief efforts to Japan (Embassy of the 
United States, 2011).  Other ships of the Ronald Reagan CSG included guided-missile 
cruiser (CG) USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), guided missile destroyer (DDG) USS Preble 
(DDG 88), and combat logistics force ship USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10) (CRS, 2011).  
Other Japan-homeported responders included the guided missile cruisers USS Shiloh (CG 
67) and USS Cowpens (CG 63); guided missile destroyers USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), 
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USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS McCambell (DDG 85) , 
and USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54); amphibious ships USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Tortuga 
(LSD 46), USS Germantown (LSD 42), and USS Harper’s Ferry (LSD 49); and 7th Fleet 
command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) (Chanlett-Avery & Feickert, 2011).  A myriad 
of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles, and amphibious 
landing craft, each able to perform unique missions as needed, accompanied the naval 
assets during Operation TOMODACHI. 
In 2007, the DoN, in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), added HA/DR 
as one of its six core capabilities, stating,  
Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we will continue to 
mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational 
efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises. 
Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of 
maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability 
to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation operations is 
critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety 
is in jeopardy. (DoN, 2007) 
This document marks the first time that the DoN significantly recognizes HA/DR as a 
legitimate mission area worthy of the same focus as missions like strategic deterrence, 
power projection, and maritime security.  For Operation TOMODACHI, the DoD 
activated elements of Joint Task Force (JTF) 519 to augment U.S. Forces Japan, later 
named Joint Support Force–Japan (JSF–J), headed by the current commander of U.S. 
Forces Japan, Air Force Lieutenant General Burton Field. 
E. OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND CIVIC 
AID FUNDING 
With the onset of a natural disaster or event that requires the DoN to provide 
humanitarian assistance, comptrollers and financial managers rely heavily on the 
OHDACA appropriation to fund obligations incurred throughout the response effort.  
According to Phillips (1997), prior to 1986, the “Department of Defense had no statutory 
authority to perform humanitarian and civic assistance, except under the Economy Act or 
as part of a security assistance program.  In 1986, Congress enacted DoD’s first statutory 
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authority in 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 401” (p. 231).  The OHDACA 
appropriation funds several statutorily authorized OHDACA programs, including those 
found in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Title 10 Statutes Pertaining to Humanitarian Assistance 
(From: Ohlweiler, 2011, p. 22) 
 
The OHDACA is a component of the defense-wide operations and maintenance 
(O&M) appropriation managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  
The DSCA is a key player in the immediate response to natural or man-made disasters 
and aids in the facilitation of humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. military forces.  
The DSCA oversees various relief and assistance programs, funding an array of relief 
programs abroad (Weinberger, 2005).  The DSCA’s OHDACA funding is a multi-year 
appropriation, which is open for obligations for a period of two years.  Once the 
appropriation has expired, the appropriation remains open for an additional five years for 
the liquidation of any outstanding expenditures.  According to the DSCA’s (2010) Fiscal 
Year 2011 Budget Estimates for OHDACA, 
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
appropriation supports the Secretary of Defense and Combatant 
Commanders’ security cooperation strategies to build indigenous 
capabilities and cooperative relationships with allies, friends, civil society, 
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and potential partners.  The appropriation provides low cost, non-obtrusive 
but highly effective activities that help partners help themselves, improves 
access to areas not otherwise available to U.S. Forces, and build 
collaborative relationships with host nation’s civil society. (p. 827) 
The DSCA’s (2010) Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates for OHDACA also breaks down 
the funding into sub-activities consisting of three operational force programs: (1) 
humanitarian assistance, (2) humanitarian mine action (HMA), and (3) the Foreign 
Disaster Relief Initiative (p.835).  The OHDACA programs support the U.S. military in 
meeting the requirements of the U.S. national security strategy and, in turn, the DSCA 
mission (Walters, 2001). 
When Congress signs the Appropriations Act into law, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) apportions the authorized amount of OHDACA funds to the DSCA.  
The DSCA then allocates the OHDACA funds through each Service’s respective Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller 
(OASN[FM&C]) to the COCOMs. 
The DSCA’s (2010) Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates for OHDACA states, 
“the Combatant Commanders’ humanitarian assistance activities reflect the priorities of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff” (p. 829).  These 
COCOMs will further distribute the spending authority to major commands and their 
subordinate activities based on requirements requested from the USAID. The USAID-
requested items and services are those specifically requested by the nation in need of 
humanitarian assistance.  Activities are only reimbursed for relevant USAID-requested 
costs. 10 U.S.C. § 2561 states that humanitarian assistance is authorized 
to the extent provided in defense authorization Acts, funds authorized to 
be appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year for 
humanitarian assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing 
transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes 
worldwide. (Humanitarian Assistance, 2011) 
At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, the OHDACA funds total $109,731 million 
(DSCA, 2010).  According to a Congressional Research Service article (Chanlett-Avery 
& Feickert, 2011), “on March 12, Secretary of Defense Gates authorized the USPACOM 
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to continue disaster relief operations and approved $35 million in OHDACA funding for 
these purposes” (p. 1).  When the multiple disasters struck Japan, the DoD had enough 
OHDACA funds available to support Operation TOMODACHI activities through 
September 30, 2011.  The OHDACA appropriation required no additional funding 
through transfer, reprogramming, or supplement. 
In a 2011 memorandum, SECDEF Robert Gates stated,  
I hereby delegate to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), or his designees, the authority to expend Overseas 
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds to render 
humanitarian assistance on a non-reimbursable basis to include the 
transportation of non-DoD personnel and supplies, search and rescue by 
aircraft and ships, damage assessment, provision of medical assistance and 
purchase of relief commodities, and refueling and sustainment operations. 
(p. 2) 
Based on the guidance from the SECDEF, the allocation of the DoN’s OHDACA funds 
used for Operation TOMODACHI flowed through the OASN(FM&C) down to the 
USPACOM.  The subordinate activities of the USPACOM submitted regular (i.e., 
weekly and monthly) cost reports pertaining to their participation efforts in Operation 
TOMODACHI.  Initially, these subordinate activities operated utilizing their own 
operating budget of O&M funds.  A military interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR) 
reimburses, with OHDACA funds, all expenditures relevant to the requirements that 
USAID requested in support of disaster relief efforts.  As previously noted, the USAID is 
the LFA for the HA/DR operations within Japan.  We further discuss the reimbursed 




To determine the operating costs for Operation TOMODACHI, we started our 
research by collecting data and information from individuals at the OASN(FM&C), the 
USPACOM, and the COMPACFLT.  We collected extensive information about 
OHDACA funding and the reimbursable process from the top level down to the unit 
level.  We obtained the original working documents and spreadsheets utilized by the 
respective commands for day-to-day, or month-to-month, tracking of Operation 
TOMODACHI obligations.  Additionally, we obtained a number of official letters, 
documents, and PowerPoint briefings related to Operation TOMODACHI and OHDACA 
funding. 
For the purposes of our analysis, we only collected cost data for the units 
supporting Operation TOMODACHI from March 1 through June 30 of fiscal year 2011.  
The analysis begins with the reconciliation of OHDACA funds flowing from the 
OASN(FM&C) through the COMPACFLT and then down to the individual ship and 
aircraft units.  In order to clearly see the flow of OHDACA funding, we performed the 
reconciliation by utilizing the previously mentioned working documents, the fiscal year 
2011 OHDACA budget, and documents from the OSD. We conducted the analysis of 
actual operating costs by first applying techniques for the derivation of incremental 
change of each budgetary account for each week following the disaster event.  We 
analyzed the cost data, then disaggregated and separated the costs by specific cost 
drivers.  We illustrated the results in table and graphical format.  This methodology is 
similar to that used by Ures (2011).   
Ures’ cost techniques provided us with the upper-level view of functional service 
costs.  Upon completion of the incremental cost breakdown for each functional service 
area, we further analyzed the costs by exploring what drove each set of cost data.  In 
order for us to explore these primary cost drivers, we utilized the spreadsheet working 
documents that the COMPACFLT provided for us.  We took the reimbursable data 
provided in the spreadsheets and tabulated the information into graphs.   
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These graphs illustrate the two primary cost drivers found through our research.  The 
purpose of this further analysis was to determine operating costs of specific ship and 
aircraft types for HA/DR missions. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. REIMBURSEMENT PROCESS 
Per 10 U.S.C. § 404 for foreign disaster assistance, the OHDACA appropriation 
funds direct costs such as transportation, supplies, services, and equipment associated 
with HA/DR missions (Foreign Disaster Assistance, 2009, § 404 (b)).  In order for the 
DoN to participate in a HA/DR mission, it must first receive authorization from the host 
nation.  The DoN must also receive authorization from the SECDEF for reimbursement 
of any expenses related to the HA/DR mission.  The amount of OHDACA funding 
approved for that particular HA/DR mission is stated within the contents of the 
SECDEF’s authorization.  For Operation TOMODACHI, the SECDEF, Robert Gates, 
granted $35 million of OHDACA funding for reimbursable expenses (Chanlett-Avery & 
Feickert, 2011, p. 1).  Although the time of authorization to start the HA/DR mission and 
the time of the grant for reimbursable funds may not always coincide, naval commands 
diligently track all direct and indirect costs incurred in support of the mission.  As 
directed, the individual commands report their costs through their chain of command to 
the Budget Submitting Office (BSO).  Once the SECDEF’s OHDACA authorization is 
given, the funding reimbursement process begins. 
When the BSO receives and verifies all of the HA/DR costs that the subordinate 
commands have reported, it then reports the reimbursements by MIPR.  A MIPR “is a 
multi-purpose document that is used between federal agencies and DoD components” 
(Potvin, 2009, p. 96).  For Operation TOMODACHI, the MIPR is the primary document 
used to reimburse the subordinate commands for incremental costs incurred during the 
HA/DR mission.  The MIPR document initiates the actual flow of OHDACA funding. 
B. OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND CIVIC 
AID FUNDING FLOW 
Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense Department 
Financial Manager (Potvin, 2009) states that “once Congress has appropriated funds and 
the President signs the appropriation into law, the spending authority must be transferred 
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to those in the agencies who will obligate the government to make payments from the 
Treasury” (p. 15).  In order to analyze the operating costs effectively, it is important to 
start from the beginning with the OASN(FM&C) planning process.  During the initial 
planning process of HA/DR funding, the OASN(FM&C) works synchronously with the 
DSCA and other key players, such as the President, the DoS, the DoD, and the USAID.  
The OASN(FM&C), as the DoN’s budget office, works closely with the Joint Staff and 
the OSD to provide HA/DR funding estimates based on information derived from a cost 
model database.  This database gives a multi-breakdown of main cost categories.  
Examples of some of these categories include personnel, personnel support, 
transportation, and operation support.  This estimate is then used as a top-line estimate for 
the authorization process (Ringstad, 2011). 
The flow of the OHDACA appropriation is depicted in Figure 8.  The 
reimbursable process for Operation TOMODACHI starts at the OASN(FM&C)/DSCA 
level.  There are a number of key players in the reimbursement process.  It is important to 
note that many activities report HA/DR costs to the OASN(FM&C).  However, this 
project focuses on only the incremental costs associated with specific activities under the 










Figure 8.   Flow of OHDACA Funding  (After: Potvin, 2009, p. 17) 
The flow of funding does not start until the individual ship and aircraft squadron 
activities report their incremental HA/DR costs up through the Commander Naval 
Surface or Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SURFPAC/AIRPAC), through the 
COMPACFLT, to their BSO, the USPACOM.  The COMPACFLT directly coordinates 
the reporting and collecting of costs through the USPACOM (Semilla, 2011).  Units 
reported costs daily during the early months of Operation TOMODACHI.  Towards the 
latter part of fiscal year 2011, reporting went from daily, weekly, and monthly reports to 
quarterly reports.  Upon completing a thorough review and verifying the reports, the 
COMPACFLT submits them to the USPACOM, who then verifies the costs and reports 
those numbers to the OASN(FM&C).  Concurrently, the USPACOM also creates an 
MIPR to reimburse all approved incremental costs related to the Operation 
TOMODACHI mission.  Unfortunately, activities that submit costs that are not directly 
tied to the HA/DR mission do not receive reimbursable funding.  Those expenses are paid 
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for directly out of that activity’s budgeted operations and maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) 
funds. 
C. OPERATION TOMODACHI FUNDING FLOW RECONCILIATION 
As we mentioned in Chapter I Section E, the original memorandum from the 
SECDEF authorized $35 million of OHDACA funding for disaster relief efforts 
(Chanlett-Avery & Feickert, 2011), but as the Operation TOMODACHI mission 
progressed, the SECDEF authorized more OHDACA funding for DoD expenditure. In an 
action memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Flournoy, 2011), 
the SECDEF granted another $10 million on top of the $95 million already authorized for 
the DoD to utilize for the Operation TOMODACHI mission.  This addition brought the 
final total of authorized reimbursable OHDACA funding to $105 million for DoD 
expenditures.  As of June 30, 2011, the OASN(FM&C) reported its status of funds as 
depicted in Figure 9.  This status shows that the DoD has obligated $80.4 million of the 
authorized $105 million.  The $24.6 million remains for obligation. 
 
 
Figure 9.   OASN(FM&C) Status of Funds  (From: Ringstad, 2011) 
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The total $33.7 million of OHDACA funding reimbursed all naval components 
and units that provided assistance.  The COMPACFLT, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR), as well as a few other DoN commands split the $33.7 
million.  In this report, we focus primarily on the amount reimbursed to units operating 
under the COMPACFLT.  According to Lieutenant Commander Semilla (2011), the 
“COMPACFLT received about $27.8M in OHDACA reimbursements for Operation 
TOMODACHI.”  
D. COST DRIVERS 
In the months following the Tohoku disaster, the DoD accumulated 
approximately $80 million in reimbursable costs associated with the Operation 
TOMODACHI response.  Figure 10 shows the breakdown of the DoD costs. The DoN’s 
portion, encompassing both the USN and United States Marine Corps (USMC), accounts 
for almost half of the total reimbursable costs.  The 50% of DoN costs may be further 
broken down into costs associated with USN and USMC operations during the Operation 
TOMODACHI mission.  An analysis of USN and USMC operations breaks down the 
costs into functional areas such as flight operations, personnel, and ship operations in 
order to see the main cost drivers.  Ures’ (2011) research of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
2004 identified many costs associated with the HA/DR response.  The preponderance of 
the costs are aircraft flight operations and ship steaming operations, which are primarily 
driven by the cost of maritime and aviation fuels.  This analysis of the Operation 
TOMODACHI costs substantiates Ures’ (2011) findings, indicating that aircraft flight 
operations and ship steaming operations are the main cost drivers of the DoN HA/DR 
mission.  These operations amount to approximately 68% of the total reimbursable costs 
associated with Operation TOMODACHI.  Figure 11 provides a detailed breakdown of 






Figure 10.   2011 HA/DR Costs for OHDACA Reimbursement by Organization 
(From:  Ringstad, 2011) 
 
To date, no published research attempts to breakdown the main cost drivers any 
further.  In an effort to determine the most cost-effective means of responding to similar 
disasters, our analysis breaks down the two most significant cost drivers.  Aircraft flight 
operations and ship steaming operations comprise 41% and 27%, respectively, of the total 









Figure 11.   2011 Tohoku Disaster: DoN Incremental OHDACA Funding  
From March 12 to March 31, 2011, the weeks following the Tohoku disaster, the 
USN and USMC logged more than 3,350 flight hours in support of Operation 
TOMODACHI. These hours included missions such as delivery of HA/DR support and 
supplies, search and rescue, logistics, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, and force 
protection (COMPACFLT, 2011).  Table 2 outlines the utilization of each aircraft type 
during Operation TOMODACHI, the number of mission flight hours flown, the 
composite rate used to calculate OHDACA reimbursement, and the total cost associated 
with each aircraft type.  Figure 12 shows the various USN and USMC aircraft employed 
throughout the response to Operation TOMODACHI, as well as the flight hours and costs 
associated with each.  The analysis of aircraft flight hours and associated costs indicate 
that fixed-wing flying hours are almost twice that of rotary-wing, 2,031 hours compared 
to 1,223 hours, and that the associated costs are nearly triple that of rotary wing flight 
operations.  The significant difference in the composite flying hour rate of each class of 
aircraft explains the variations between the aircraft types.  For example, a USMC CH-
46E costs approximately $4,408 per flight hour to operate, whereas a USN F/A-18F costs 
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over $9,200 per flight hour (COMPACFLT, 2011).  These rates are extracted from the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N43 Flying Hours Program (FHP), a 
database that tracks a three-year moving average of costs associated with operating all 
aircraft that the USN and USMC flies. 
 
Table 2.   Operation TOMODACHI Flying Hours and Associated Costs 
 
 


















USMC CH‐46E 336 4,408$                  1,480.95$            
USMC CH‐53E 12 11,714$                140.57$                
USMC KC‐130J 409 4,239$                  1,733.26$            
USMC UC‐12F 128 1,756$                  224.26$                
USMC UC‐12W 53 1,136$                  59.63$                  
USMC UC‐35D 125 1,454$                  327.03$                
USN C‐12 75 1,749$                  130.33$                
USN C‐2A 193 8,586$                  1,657.02$            
USN E‐2C 200 6,604$                  1,324.86$            
USN EA‐6B 50 8,994$                  447.90$                
USN FA‐18C/E/F* 979 9,226$                  5,318.09$            
USN H‐60B/F/S/H* 875 3,534$                  3,166.50$            








Figure 12.   Operation TOMODACHI Flying Hour Costs by Aircraft Type and Category 













From March 11 to April 9, 2011, USN ships consumed more than 80,000 barrels, 
or nearly 3.4 million gallons, of marine-grade diesel fuel (DFM) in direct support of 
Operation TOMODACHI (COMPACFLT, 2011).  Figure 13 displays the quantity of 
DFM consumed by the USN broken down by ship class.  This fuel, valued during the 
disaster at $126.84 per barrel, amounted to $10.2 million of OHDACA reimbursable 
costs.    
 
Figure 13.   Operation TOMODACHI USN Steaming Barrels Consumed  
Figure 14 details fuel costs associated with each class of ship and the 
corresponding month in response to the Tohoku disaster.  The graph illustrates that the 
six DDGs burned $3.9 million in fuel, accounting for 38.5% of all fuel burned during the 
30-day response period.  This cost can be further broken down to $21,859 per DDG per 
day of response.  Due to the loitering nature of HA/DR response operations, this number 
is significantly lower than the fiscal year 2011 deployed rate of $71,665 per DDG per day 







Figure 14.   Operation TOMODACHI Steaming Fuel Costs 
In events similar to the Tohoku disaster, the USN component responsible for 
responding to the mission—the COMPACFLT, in this case—must make necessary 
arrangements to respond immediately.  However, to request OHDACA funding 
reimbursement, costs such as fuel consumption must be forecasted and a planning budget 
created.  In the case of Operation TOMODACHI, COMPACFLT and OPNAV created 
budget forecasts using the ShipOps model.  The USN uses the web-based FHP and Ship 
Ops model to budget for the operational costs associated with humanitarian response and 
other missions.  The ShipOps model, which is similar to the FHP, also uses a three-year 
moving average of historical data to forecast costs such as fuel consumption, repair parts, 
consumables, utilities, and administration/training (Dini, 2011). 
E. OTHER FINDINGS 
The information from the OASN(FM&C) and COMPACFLT provided a vast 
amount of useful data about the Operation TOMODACHI HA/DR mission.  Due to the 
focus of our project on the analysis of Operation TOMODACHI costs, this additional 
information is not applicable to our analysis.  However, the information is very important 
in terms of what actually occurred with the resources provided during the mission.  Three 
additional important findings are as follows: 
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1. Too Much “Lean Forward” 
Moments after the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami, before the 
Japanese government formally requested humanitarian assistance, the USN rushed to 
initiate humanitarian relief efforts by sending supplies into the area.  As Dini (2011) 
explains, the Navy provided many supplies in support of the HA/DR mission with the 
understanding the costs reported were reimbursable. Therefore, in an attempt to recapture 
the costs of the material, activities submitted these expenses in their requests for 
reimbursement from OHDACA funding.  As already mentioned in Chapter IV Section B, 
activities that incur costs that are not approved for reimbursement with OHDACA 
funding must pay for those expenses out of their own budgeted O&M, N funds.  The 
problem with the reimbursement process is that not all costs submitted in an activity’s 
request get reimbursed (Ringstad, 2011), which may result in a significant funding loss 
for the DoN (Dini, 2011; Semilla, 2011).  This problem occurs due to the USN’s push to 
get supplies within the vicinity of the disaster as early as possible.  The USN does this so 
that when the formal request from the Japanese government and USAID is received, the 
USN will already have the requested supplies on hand.  Unfortunately, for official 
OHDACA funds reimbursement, the government of Japan must specifically request each 
item.  
2. Excess Supply 
 Our research also uncovered another problem involving excess supplies 
sent to Japan but not turned over for the HA/DR mission.  The build-up of supplies such 
as water and meals ready to eat (MREs) occurred during the rush to push supplies 
forward in anticipation of the needs of the Japanese government.  Many USN units, based 
on previous experience with HA/DR missions, actively pushed these supplies.  
Unfortunately, many of these supplies were not properly turned over to the nation of 
Japan because the Japanese government did not actually request them.  
Before the Operation TOMODACHI mission concluded, the majority of the 
excess supplies were collected by Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) Yokosuka where a large 
scale inventory was taken (Dini, 2011).  At that point, the supplies remained in a 
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warehouse, were returned to originating units, or were marked for transaction reversal, 
returning them to the supply system.  Near the end of the Operation TOMODACHI 
mission, the USN attempted to differentiate the excess supplies returned to FISC 
Yokosuka in order to remove all of those costs from reimbursement requests.  FLC 
Yokosuka captured the costs associated with over 1,200 pallets of returned material 
(Semilla, 2011). 
3. Concurrent Missions 
In addition to the actual disaster relief and consequence management efforts, the 
DoN was largely engaged in a large-scale military-assisted departure for DoD civilians 
and dependents. OHDACA could not reimburse these efforts because the efforts did not 
directly support the government of Japan.  The DoN was also heavily involved in other 
efforts due to the nuclear crisis; however, cleanup costs on affected ships or bases did not 
qualify for OHDACA reimbursement.  Some of the general monitoring in Japan was 
reimbursable, and some was not.  If a ship directly participated in the disaster relief 
efforts, some cleanup expenses could be submitted for reimbursement.  For example, an 
aircraft carrier participating in flight operations in support of the disaster did qualify for 
reimbursement for completing a wash-down at sea while near the coast (Dini, 2011).  
However, the cost of setting up long-term monitoring equipment on bases to ensure DoD 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The DoN must ensure that its HA/DR operations are both effective and fiscally 
efficient.  However, the DoN cannot accurately forecast all potential HA/DR missions or 
the costs associated with responding to each one because each disaster and corresponding 
response costs are different.  Therefore, identifying and analyzing the direct and indirect 
operating costs and the elements driving the associated costs is critical for budget 
analysts, comptrollers, and operational planners so that they can better prepare for future 
disasters.  The DoN’s Operation TOMODACHI HA/DR mission, and its initial response, 
provides us with lessons to be learned and, therefore, recommendations for improvement. 
We determined that the incremental operating costs for the HA/DR missions in 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2010 Pakistan floods, and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
(Ures, 2011) were similar to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.  Our analysis took 
Ures’ technique one step further to determine the specific unit types, which incurred the 
most operating costs throughout the response.  Our findings found that even though 
financial obligations for response material are made quickly, they should be made 
efficiently to ensure timely reimbursement.  Additionally, ship and flight operations are 
the most costly and are best provided by the DoD.  Finally, HA/DR missions remain a 
naval core competency, and the best way to maximize current capabilities is to improve 
information sharing and technological advancement.  These results are in line with the 
conclusions of Ures (2011).   
This research only examined cost drivers behind half of the $80 million in 
reimbursable OHDACA funding used in support of Operation TOMODACHI and did not 
examine any of the financial or operational aspects of the response to the nuclear disaster.  
Each of these is considered an area with great potential for further research.  Based on 
our observation and analysis, we have identified several opportunities for improvement, 
which we will now discuss.  
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A. LACK OF STANDARD CONTINGENCY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
GUIDANCE 
During Operation TOMODACHI, financial guidance developed slowly due to 
personnel learning curves.  For example, cost reporting guidance began with a FMR 
reference, adding specific answers periodically over time.  The DoN required a standard 
supporting spreadsheet, but other activities did not have a similar requirement.  Preceding 
legal opinions on OHDACA and HA/DR operations were useful but not readily available.  
Each Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)-related question was researched by 
the operational comptroller to determine funding sources and entitlements, and many 
entitlement questions arose for personnel deployed to Yokota. 
We recommend that COCOMs and the OSD establish standard contingency 
financial management guidance for JTFs for major types of operations.  Contingency 
financial management guidance includes cost-reporting, cost-estimating, cost-
reimbursement, NEO operations, and HA/DR operations.  In turn, this guidance should 
be used as the basis for exercise finance cells.  Once this guidance is promulgated, JTFs 
develop off-the-shelf policies for contingency entitlements.  COCOM reimbursement 
guidance should explain how OHDACA funds reimbursements are made and authorized 
by using the standardized supporting documentation report.  We also recommend that 
participating activities submit all cost data daily and segregate costs by major operations 
types.  These recommendations will help alleviate redundancy and confusion. 
B. LACK OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Critical central organization of an HA/DR requirement approval process did not 
exist from the beginning of Operation TOMODACHI (Dini, 2011).  The lack of central 
command and control resulted in consistently revised guidance for many responding 
activities.  Thus, activities were told to support and lean forward in an effort to support 
relief efforts.  However, the central authority providing procedure, guidance, and 
authorization did not exist to explain exactly what each activity was authorized to do.  
Without command and control, many activities assumed what material was needed to 
support the HA/DR mission, as well as what material and efforts could be reimbursed.  
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Therefore, we recommend the creation of an organized central command and control 
structure at the onset of the disaster.  Once the structure is established, we recommend the 
promulgation of central guidance to all responding activities. 
C. DEMAND FOR COST-ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES 
Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, the USPACOM OHDACA analyst 
provided cost estimates prior to each authorization memorandum from the SECDEF for 
OHDACA funds.  These memorandums were often compiled within a short time frame.  
For example, the OMB required JSF to provide cost estimates for approximately 200 
requests from the government of Japan within 24 hours.  Meanwhile, JSF required cost 
estimates for long-term radiation and environmental monitoring to help budget for 
potential costs for military installations in Japan (Dini, 2011).  We recommend that JTFs 
develop and practice cost-estimating techniques using a defined construct during 
response exercises such as Terminal Fury. 
D. DAILY CONSOLIDATED COST REPORTING AND LATE REPORTING 
U.S. Forces-Japan (USF-J) requested and collected costs before cost-reporting 
relationships existed.  Daily phone calls were made to help coordinate cost reporting.  
Unfortunately, Service comptrollers did not want to consolidate cost reports for their 
services and service headquarters (HQ) did not share cost reports with the USPACOM.  
The OSD required daily cost reports without requiring segregation of OHDACA and 
other costs.  Additionally, the OSD did not report discrepancies in reports from the 
USPACOM and Service HQs.  Another problem was late reporting from many Navy and 
Air Force units, as well as duplicative reporting to USF-J.  Thus, we recommend that the 
COCOM request daily cost reports from Service HQs to share with the JTF.  The daily 
standardized cost reports should include their tasked units, missions, and the number of 
personnel supporting the operation.   
By relying on historic cost data provided by collective daily cost reporting, budget 
analysts may more effectively anticipate HA/DR costs and needs notwithstanding that 
each disaster varies in scope and mission.  By successfully advocating improved data 
reporting and increasing communication interfacing, the DoN will successfully maintain 
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its exceptional core competencies by continuing its mission to support HA/DR operations 
around the globe.  Thus, we also recommend that the JTF, COCOM, and OSD request 
cost segregation by situation and funding type.  We also recommend that regional service 
comptrollers validate and consolidate costs daily for their Service’s commands. 
E. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS 
When JTF comptrollers push operational data to the JTF commander, OHDACA 
and other funds can be tracked and key cost drivers determined.  During Operation 
TOMODACHI, other leads pushed changes in operations to support the budget when the 
comptroller was not present, due to rank, to answer funding questions in briefings (Dini, 
2011).  We recommend that JTFs develop and practice cost-estimating techniques using a 
defined construct during response exercises such as Terminal Fury.  We also recommend 
that comptrollers, regardless of rank, be allowed to participate in briefings that involve 
fiscal matters.  Further, JTF comptrollers should be consulted for funding paragraph input 
for outgoing messages and financial managers should provide consolidating guidance and 
review daily messages. 
Order messages were written along operational chains of command vice 
administrative during Operation TOMODACHI, which prevented some activities from 
receiving critical and routine messages.  We recommend that the JTF streamline cost-
reporting lines of communication to ensure that all administrative chains of command 
receive key message traffic.  We also recommend that HA/DR stakeholders within the 
DoD invest in a common communication network that enables information collaboration 
for cost-reporting, outgoing message traffic, and aid requisition during HA/DR 
operations.  As Ures (2011) explained, broader communication feedback “may yield cost 
savings through improved efficiencies” (p. 41).   
F. “PUSH” WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
During Operation TOMODACHI, OHDACA funds were only reimbursed for 
relief supplies turned over with USAID approval.  As a result, supply quickly exceeded 
demand.  Unfortunately, the additional supplies were never turned over for the HA/DR 
efforts but were either left in a warehouse, returned to originating units, or the placed 
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back into the stock system after transactions were reversed (Semilla, 2011).  At the end of 
Operation TOMODACHI, 1,200 pallets of excess relief supplies remained on station 
(Dini, 2011).  Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, the DoN activities made obligations 
quickly to initiate the aid response.  Thus, humanitarian supplies such as water and MREs 
were offloaded from a ship and flown to a landing site to support the response effort.  
However, because the Japanese government did not actually request the supplies directly, 
these supplies were not properly turned over.  As a result, only a portion of these supplies 
was reimbursed (Semilla, 2011).  We recommend that responding activities not lean too 
far forward in buying and pushing relief supplies.  Instead, we recommend that activities 
first identify capacity and then move inventory to forward locations once relief supplies 
are requested.  Additionally, we recommend that forward installations update their NEO 
plans to avoid large sudden funding requirements (Dini, 2011). 
G. THE REIMBURSEMENT PROCESS 
When a disaster occurs, activities initially obligate their direct funds and then 
request OHDACA funding reimbursement.  Unfortunately, many costs submitted by an 
activity in support of Operation TOMODACHI were not reimbursed, which resulted in a 
substantial loss to the DoN (Dini, 2011).  Additionally, when material is not considered 
incremental, activities are not reimbursed.  For example, Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command (CFFC) had costs supporting radiological and biological aspects for the 
nuclear power plant, but these costs were not reimbursed because these costs were 
considered to be a service responsibility, thus not reimbursable through OHDACA 
(Ringstad, 2011).  Consequently, we recommend streamlining the reimbursement process 
of an activity’s request for reimbursement through the COCOM.  We also recommend 
that HA/DR stakeholders within the DoN develop standard reporting requirements and 
ensure that all potential responders know what the reimbursement procedures are well 
before a disaster occurs.  Then, at the start of a disaster, all responding activities will have 
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